INTRODUCTION
This research report focuses on the role that the US military has played in the Horn of Africa,
The United States military has demonstrated difficulties in embracing strategic knowledge and perspective in its approaches to countering violent extremism and assisting with sustainable development in the Horn of Africa. This paper examines the efforts of US Africa Command (AFRICOM), the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), and civil affairs (CA) teams in their missions to address security concerns, generate good will, promote sustainable development, and strengthen the capabilities of regional militaries. Also discussed are the efforts of the US Department of State which has adopted an indirect, but assertive approach to working with regional governments and organizations against violent extremism, particularly in Somalia.
In response to the rise of Al Qaeda, the DoS responded with the East African Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI) and later the East African Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI). They were launched as interagency efforts to enable African states to strengthen their borders and intelligence and policing capacity and enhance aviation security and safety. 4 Since 2007, DoS has focused on backing African then Somali partners to defeat Al Shabaab and reconstitute a state in Somalia, which it was hoped would put an end to a significant source of violent extremism in the Horn of Africa. This included supporting proxy armies in Somalia, with the hope that they would curb extremist expansion. Initially, DoS supported Somali warlords as a counter against extremists. In December 2006, the United States acquiesced to the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia as a way of defeating the extremist elements of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). 5 Since 2007, the United States has spent over $650 million, 6 and DoS has led in arranging a wide range of support for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia in the hope that they could defeat Al Shabaab and establish national security and constitutional order. The DoS strategy met with skepticism on the part of those who asserted that the best that could be hoped for in Somalia was "stability" and a balance of power among the clans and sub-clans. 7 However, in 2011 and 2012, the DoS strategy scored significant successes; AMISOM and Somali forces pushed Al Shabaab out of urban centers in Somalia and a new constitution and government of Somalia with a president from civil society was put in place. DoS has entered a new phase in Somalia where it must decide whether to continue to engage indirectly or become more directly involved in rebuilding Somalia and preventing the resurgence of Al Shabaab and violent extremism. DoS is proceeding cautiously in reestablishing a US embassy in Mogadishu, especially after the 2012 attack on the US Consulate in Benghazi, Libya.
Strategic Knowledge and Perspective and Report Methodology
Evaluation of strategic knowledge and perspective in countering violent extremists involve assessment of US interests and goals and the ways and means to achieve them. For example, strategic knowledge and perspective were deficient in the decision to invade Iraq as a way of preventing violent extremists from getting access to weapons of mass destruction. The primary US interest in Eastern Africa is security from violent extremist attacks against US embassies, businesses and citizens and against the US homeland. One threat is from pro-Al Shabaab Somali nationals living in Minneapolis and other
American cities and the possibility that they might mount attacks on the homeland. Al Shabaab has links with Al Qaeda Central (AQ-C) along the Afghan-Pakistan border and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and has issued threats against US interests. However, the threat from Al Shabaab is less serious than the one posed by AQ-C and AQAP, which still have the proven potential to mount attacks on the United States and its interests. Al Shabaab has carried on attacks outside Somalia but has not yet attacked US interests in Africa or the United States.
Given US interests and the threat, the strategic options have been (1) elimination of violent extremist organizations; (2) containment within the borders of Somalia or (3) marginalization within Somalia. A strategy of elimination would have been too costly and unachievable; Al Shabaab has been elusive. 8 Containment was viable but risky; Al Shabaab still could have attempted to mount an attack on US interests in the sub-region and the homeland. The marginalization of Al Shabaab appeared feasible and the most desirable for US security interests, weakening the organization so that militants could not attack the US homeland and US interests. The strategy involved pushing Al Shabaab out of urban areas.
In regard to the ways that could used to accomplish the ends, the three options for the United
States were (1) counterterrorism and securing borderlands in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti; (2) working with African forces and Somalis to marginalize Al Shabaab and reconstitute the Republic of Somalia; or (3) putting US boots on the ground in Somalia to eliminate Al Shabaab. The first option was chosen by the DoD, while DoS adopted the second one.
In regard to means, pursuing an elimination strategy and placing US boots on the ground in The US military's containment strategy, including plans to generate good will among subregional partners and build partnership capacity and win the hearts and minds of Somali pastoralists, did not appear to have been indicative of strategic knowledge and perspective. The strategy addressed peripheral issues with the hope that would have an effect on trends inside Somalia. It attempted to contain Al Shabaab and not to marginalize the movement. Also, the strategy of US Civil Affairs (CA) teams working with African CA teams in order to build their capabilities appears to thus far have had limited impact. In particular, Kenyan CA teams have trained and exercised with US CA teams, but they have not engaged with Somalis as AFRICOM and CJTF-HOA preferred.
In explaining the US military's shortcomings in embracing strategic knowledge and perspective in the Horn of Africa, one hypothesis is that the more a military force is casualty averse, the less it will be able to apply strategic knowledge and perspective to fighting extremists. The Black Hawk down episode in Mogadishu in 1993 set a precedent for casualty aversion. The second hypothesis is that the US military is likely to seek out new roles and missions no matter how detached from strategic knowledge and perspective, producing "mission creep." This is likely to happen as organizations seek to justify their existence.
The third hypothesis is that the fact that the US military has been constrained by having to operate in a "Title 22 zone" where US ambassadors can veto the plans of combatant commanders and which prevents the military from carrying out anything more robust than a containment strategy. This constraint prevents the US military from demonstrating strategic knowledge and perspective. 18 The Rwandan Defense Force has engaged with CJTF-HOA CA teams;
however, its CA teams are in Darfur and not in Somalia.
Reports on CJTF-HOA and CA Team Projects
A 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report raised questions about the costeffectiveness and utility of CJTF-HOA, as AFRICOM was assuming responsibility from CENTCOM. 19 In regard to cost effectiveness, in the 2010 budget, the US Navy provided $80 million for CJTF-HOA;
and $238m for Camp Lemonnier operations were pulled from contingency funds. Given AFRICOM's difficulties in persuading Congress to fully meet its own funding requests, attempting to secure another several hundred million dollars a year for CJTF-HOA was called into question in the report.
The GAO report found that civil affairs comprised 60 percent of CJTF-HOA's activities.
However, CJTF-HOA CA teams were limited in their funding. Two million dollars in Humanitarian and Civic Affairs funding (see Appendix C) was restricted and tied to military deployment and US military training of African militaries; therefore, CA teams could not use this money unless they were training African CA teams. 20 There were only $2 million in Humanitarian funds which were not tied to military deployment and could be used by CA teams to help civilians. Also, there were problems with multiple funding sources and contracts.
Other issues raised in the report included the fact that there was no follow-up or measurement of CA and other activities. One of the most important drawbacks was the 4-12 month tours for CA teams and other personnel. Therefore, the embassies were always training CJTF-HOA personnel. CA teams had § Title 10 of the US Code, Armed Forces outlines the roles of the US military particularly in combat operations in which the Department of Defense is the lead US actor. A joint AFRICOM and CJTF-HOA report 2010 provided a more positive assessment of the work of CA teams and defended them from criticisms, 22 especially from the Tufts report. 23 However, the report was also critical. First, it found CA teams did not articulate mission statements consistently. CA teams did not receive prior training about socio-cultural issues, language, and working with interagency partners, and they felt constrained by the limited time in field to conduct engagements and complete missions. CA teams described success as measures of performance (how the projects were implemented), not effectiveness of the projects they undertook. The report concurred with the Tufts report that CA teams were a visible component of USG policy implementation and that civil-military operations, development, and humanitarian assistance were often seen as overlapping or similar in scope and work. The relations of CA teams with stakeholders were defined by gift-giving and the development and management of expectations and the conducting of assessments. They were not delivering the goods and services that the local populations expected.
In spite of the criticisms, DoD and AFRICOM decided to keep CJTF-HOA because of its strategic location. CJTF-HOA allowed the United States to respond to contingencies within the Horn, supplied in-theater personnel for AFRICOM, and provided additional resources to embassies in the region. The task force had demonstrated that it was able to build relationships and goodwill with officials where CA and other activities were held. Last but not least, CJTF-HOA was positioned to counteract subregional terrorist threats. These points are reflected in the CJTF-HOA mission statement:
The mission of CJTF-HOA involves an indirect approach to counter violent extremism. CJTF-HOA, as part of US African Command (AFRICOM), conducts operations to strengthen partner nation and regional security capacity to enable long-term regional stability, prevent conflict and protect US and Coalition interests. CJTF-HOA builds friendships, forges relationships, and creates partnerships to enable African solutions to African challenges. CJTF-HOA aims, through its combined joint forces, to improve security, increase stability and strengthen sovereignty in the Horn of Africa and Eastern Africa region through being a model for the integration of Defense, Diplomacy and Development efforts. U.S. policy in Somalia is guided by our support for the Djibouti peace process. The Djibouti peace process is an African-led initiative which enjoys the support of IGAD, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. It also enjoys the support of the African Union and the key states in the region. The Djibouti peace process has also been supported by the United Nations, the European Community, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Conference. The Djibouti peace process recognizes the importance of trying to put together an inclusive Somali government and takes into account the importance of the history, culture, clan, and sub-clan relations that have driven the conflict in Somalia for the past 20 years. It appeared that Somalia would be the most difficult of all failed states to reconstitute with a topdown security and state-building approach. In terms of state security, Somalia has ranked at the bottom of the failed states list, as it has lacked state institutions for more than two decades. 30 The TFG was supposed to pave the way for the reconstitution of government in Somalia, but it has been corrupt and heavyhanded. 31 In regard to state failure and elite corruption, Somalia is comparable to the cases of Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Policy circles debated the feasibility of a top-down security approach for Somalia versus a bottom-up "stability" one, which would take into account representation from clans and inter-clan dynamics (See Appendix B: Map of Somali clans). 32 Therefore, DoS was being advised to confine its efforts to a bottom-up peacebuilding approach. However, for more than five years, the DoS and other entities pursued a policy of attempting to establish nation-state security in Somalia, so that Al Shabaab could be defeated and the process of peacebuilding, renewal, and representation could begin to take hold throughout the country. The argument was that state security was essential before representation and renewal could fully develop.
In spite of the difficulties with state-building and stability in Somalia, DoS and other entities continued to pursue a top-down security approach. 33 They persisted with the Somali peace process that led to the establishment of the TFG and AMISOM and the ultimate goal of reconstituting the Republic of Somalia. The DoS supported the AU, IGAD and concerned African states in the peacemaking, enforcement, and state-building project in the hope that the Somalia problem could finally be resolved and prevent Al Qaeda and other extremists from establishing a base there. Thus, in DoS, there was an inclination towards states and sovereignty as the basis for peace and security and an inherent belief that the establishment of a skeleton state-with some form of representation and a proto-military -would inevitably establish security and bring stability. Also, there was confidence that inter-clan dynamics could be managed by an inclusive government. 34 In that vein, an August 2012 deadline was established to pressure Somali leaders to end the TFG and establish a permanent government in Mogadishu. On the political front, in August 2012, a constitutional convention with representation from clan elders adopted a new constitution for Somalia, which paved the way for the election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. In September 2012, the TFG handed over power to a permanent federal government in
Mogadishu. While the new president and government came to power through a top-down process, he has been a civil society activist who promised to bring a "bottom-up" approach to peacemaking and peacebuilding. The new government has been working to develop the institutions necessary to run a modern state that could earn the confidence of its people, would be legitimate and democratically elected, and could engage in long-term efforts to provide for a better standard of living for the Somali people. It is still uncertain how much change there will be and how the new government will work, as some of the same old, corrupt faces from the TFG will be players in the political process. The establishment of a new Somali government and Somali security forces presents an opportunity to bring about security, representation and renewal, but the outlook is not encouraging. Thus far, Somali clans and inter-clan dynamics have not been alienated by the AMISOM offensive and the establishment of the new government, though the situation will remain tenuous. The government and its forces are likely to remain weak for some time to come and unable to gain full control over South-Central Somalia. 38 Representation will be exercised through the new Somali parliament, but it will have to develop leverage over the new president and other decision-makers. In regard to renewal, it will be slow and remain dependent on international aid.
There is still considerable evidence that the top-down security enterprise is not likely to succeed Qaeda and other violent extremists. This is clear from the recent AFRICOM mission statement and list of priorities. Accordingly, CJTF-HOA was to become part of General Ham's vision to make the command more focused on warfighting and related security cooperation activities. 40 Until recently, seventy percent of AFRICOM's efforts has been focused on Eastern Africa. 41 Therefore, Eastern Africa was the first sub-region for which AFRICOM produced a campaign plan -the 2012 East African Campaign Plan (EACP). The EACP has been generated at AFRICOM headquarters and has laid out how the US military should operate in the sub-region based upon threats to US interests. 42 The EACP is supposed to provide direction for all DoD elements in Eastern Africa, including CJTF-HOA. Accordingly, CJTF-HOA programs and projects are expected to be based on AFRICOM priorities and targets in the EACP. CJTF-HOA and US embassies, particularly in Nairobi and Addis
Ababa were not consulted in the formulation of the plan, even though they have been embedded in the region.
At issue are the degree of command and control that AFRICOM will exercise over CJTF-HOA and the level of strategic knowledge and perspective that AFRICOM staff will be able to bring to bear in the sub-region. Given the positive turn of events in Somalia in 2011 and 2012, most AFRICOM staff members interviewed (especially in the J-2) were not attuned to the evidence of change and could be judged to be somewhat deficient in strategic knowledge and perspective and flexibility. 47 Their pessimistic perspectives were based on the long-established narrative about Somalia being deeply divided by clan, sub-clan and violent extremists and about AMISOM being ineffectual. 48 The most pessimistic AFRICOM intelligence official felt that there was no hope for the new government in Somalia and that the situation would be much worse in the coming years due to formidable problems of food insecurity and demographics. In fact, a J2 report on Somalia was quite pessimistic. In addition, several J2 personnel pointed to the approximately one million Somalis living in Kenya and the possibility of an Al Shabaab attack in Nairobi and elsewhere in the sub-sub-region.
In regard to CJTF-HOA CA projects, a former USAID official who was working for the AFRICOM J5 commented that the law restricts much CA activity. For instance, most CA projects that were aimed against violent extremists had to have an effect through host militaries in order to be funded (see Appendix C). Also, he observed that it is now clear that USAID is in charge of planning and executing development programs forces and that the military is in support. 49 In regard to the 3D concept, CA teams are in a limited and supporting role. As for engaging inside Somalia, the thinking was that CA teams and other AFRICOM and CJTF-HOA units (besides special operations forces) could not enter the country but could only continue to engage indirectly with Somalia through CA teams operating in the surrounding sub-region. Somalia had to be safe and secure first.
In sum, AFRICOM perspectives on the Horn of Africa and on CJTF-HOA reflect a struggle to gain strategic knowledge and perspective about the area of operations and to gain command and control over CJTF-HOA and over security cooperation in embassy defense offices. The combatant commander was ahead of his staff in awareness about Somalia. The distance between AFRICOM HQ and Eastern
Africa and the limited knowledge and perspective of key staff make command and control in and planning for the area of operations problematic. Also, DoD's reluctance to engage inside Somalia may affect the willingness and ability of AFRICOM and CJTF-HOA to assist in stabilization and reconstruction.
CJTF-HOA 50
The perspective of most personnel interviewed is that of a task force occupying a geo-strategic position between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa and executing civil affairs projects and special forces operations in the "arc of instability" with extremism in Eastern Africa over a decade. 51 Among the leadership interviewed in mid-2012, there was a sense of pride in the accomplishments of the CA teams, special operations forces and other units. There was a perception of worthwhile 3D cooperation in Djibouti and Kenya, while CJTF-HOA and USAID were seen to be working well together in Ethiopia. While leaders believed that much had been achieved over the decade, they also commented that considerable changes needed to be made. CJTF-HOA perspectives on the changing situation in Somalia were that the task force had contributed to the success of AMISOM and that nothing more could be done as long as the task force was not allowed to operate inside Somalia. Once diplomatic relations were reestablished and the US Embassy in Mogadishu reopened, CJTF-HOA could consider engaging directly. 52 One question is whether or not CJTF-HOA will assist in developing CA teams for the military of the Republic of Somalia.
The recognition of the shortcomings of CJTF-HOA and the need for change were based on the perspective that the leadership had been focusing at the tactical level, concentrating on the deployment and activities of CA teams and keeping tabs on each of them in the field to ensure desired results were achieved and to ensure that problems were avoided. Now that CJTF-HOA has been tasked by AFRICOM to operationalize the EACP and undertake combined and joint activities, the task force needs to move from the tactical to the operational level in order to be able to implement AFRICOM's EACP. The EACP was causing uncertainty among CJTF-HOA leaders and staff, because of deficient structures to implement the plan and also about the future of CA activities, which were to be more closely tied to the EACP and its goals of counterterrorism, defeating Al Shabaab, and building partner defense capability. 53 In regard to security cooperation, there was a proposal that security cooperation officers work directly for the AFRICOM commander rather than for the AFRICOM J5, which would bring them more in line with the EACP. Such an arrangement would help with manning at AFRICOM HQ and mil-to-mil cooperation. However, there was also recognition of the legal difficulties involving Title 22 (foreign relations and intercourse).
There were plans for shifting to a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) by 2015 and bringing in civilian agencies to deal with violent extremist organization financing and illegal trafficking -the Horn's major challenges. Command and control was problematic for CJTF-HOA in 2012 and would be more so if a JIATF were to be established. However, a JIATF would make it easier to navigate the issues of Title 10 authorities in a Title 22 environment. 54 A broader and longer term view at the CJTF-HOA J5 was that the embassy-oriented approach of DoS and defense attaché offices was reflective of the Westphalian system of state sovereignty and the Cold War. Such an approach was not appropriate for regions, like Eastern Africa, with porous borders and weak sovereignty. Accordingly, the geographical combatant command, task force, and USAID regional office were more appropriate to meeting cross-border challenges. Therefore, the argument was that security cooperation should be under the control of AFRICOM and CJTF-HOA. 55 Another recognized problem was turnover and instability in the task force. In regard to short learning. For the first five years, the commander was a US Marine one-star and for the next five, a US Navy one-star. Now the command has shifted to a US Army two-star who wants to advance US security interests, counterterrorism, and building relations with heads of state in the sub-region. 56 Major General
Ralph O. Baker was also expected to undo some of the engagement activities that previous commanders had authorized and were subsequently deemed to be inappropriate. He was seeking to align every action to push towards fulfillment of CJTF-HOA's mission, including the placement of CA teams in the Ogaden and the Kenya coast. to a lack of support from the local military and the US embassy and USAID. One CJTF-HOA official opined that CA teams should move away from building infrastructure (wells, schools and clinics) and towards English language training and MEDCAPS and VETCAPS (medical and veterinary assistance). 64 Another official saw CJTF-HOA in more mil-to-mil engagements with sub-regional militaries in trying to help to develop their civil engineering capacity and combat engineering capability and repairing their heavy equipment. 65 An officer in the J5 who was brought in to strengthen assessment and evaluation of CJTF-HOA was critical of CA activities. Many CA teams ended up in areas that were not impactful due to host country restrictions or the CJTF-HOA commander's concerns, and this raised questions about their utility. 66 Often, CA teams made promises that could not be fulfilled as Commander Emergency Response
Program (CERP) funds were not available. AFRICOM, in a case of micromanagement took a thousand dollar fund away from one team that was deemed not to have been using it properly. The extra layer of command was making funding and implementation of CA projects problematic. Another problem was the surplus of CA teams that were looking for projects to do and not necessarily what the communities needed. A Djibouti city CA team teased out their mission based on their activities rather than starting with a general idea of what should be affected. There were numerous problematic cases in which projects that were supposed to be locally controlled were stalled by delays in repairs and funding. 67 Furthermore, there was no evidence that military information support operations (MISO) were any more effective than CA projects in countering violent extremism or even building partnerships and goodwill. It was uncertain what MISO teams were supposed to do or what they were supposed to convey.
One example was when a woman accused a shop-owner of being Al Shabaab (when he was not); this was misreported by the MISO team as a success in outing terrorists. 68 An example of problems with CJTF-HOA Civil Affairs activities was in the building of a bridge near Awasa, Ethiopia, which was "over-engineered" by the Seabees (Naval engineers) and built to US standards which called into question its cost effectiveness. The Seabees asserted that the CA teams had overpromised to the local population and did not understand the need for soil and load-bearing analyses.
CA teams were promising $8,000 latrines to local populations, and the Seabees found that they were unsustainable. Also, it was difficult to alter CA projects that had been in the chute for several years and passed through the hands of a number of different CA teams. 69 There was difficulty spending the In sum, CJTF-HOA lacks strategic knowledge and perspective due to the high turnover of personnel, though there are some pockets of excellence. One CJTF-HOA official commented that there was a need for self-criticism and the need for evaluation of the impact of CA projects and that the commander and leadership needed to ask what the task force was doing and why. 71 Greater strategic knowledge and perspective were needed at CJTF-HOA regarding the uses of CA teams, now that they are no longer being used to counter violent extremism and sustainable development. "Generating goodwill"
among African partner nations is not a compelling strategy. A concerted effort is needed if CJTF-HOA intends to build the CA capacity of African partner militaries and see African CA teams perform in Somalia and other places where civilians need to be reached.
US Embassy, Djibouti 72
The US embassy and USAID in Djibouti have assumed a similar perspective as CJTF-HOA on the US military's mission of countering violent extremism in the Horn of Africa. The 3Ds (diplomacy, development, defense) are operational in Djibouti in that the embassy and USAID continue to work and harmonize with CJTF-HOA and the CA teams in generating goodwill with Djiboutian. The Defense
Office in the Embassy is satisfied with placing security cooperation is in the hands of the CJTF-HOA J5. 73 The USAID director has been working closely with CA teams that are in the field in Djibouti. A development aid expert asserted that education and English language training were the most effective programs run by CJTF-HOA CA teams in the rural areas. 74 CA teams reported to the USAID director and the CJTF-HOA liaison at the embassy on the progress of their projects. 75 USAID funded several capacitybuilding projects to the tune of $3.6 million. 76 According to the USAID director in Djibouti, a problem for CJTF-HOA CA teams has been the non-sustainability of well-drilling in Djibouti, given that pump parts were breaking. Also, there has been widespread salinity in the water table that was affecting the wells. Therefore, well-drilling had been suspended, which meant that a principal way of winning hearts and minds through sustainable development projects was off the table. 77 The Djiboutian government needs to develop a sustainment plan for water. 78 The US Embassy (with twelve to fifteen personnel) assists CJTF-HOA in maintaining good relations with Djiboutian President Ismail Omar Guelleh and his regime and in ensuring CJTF-HOA's presence in the country and extensions of the lease at Camp Lemonnier. 79 There are allegations that the president has been diverting the money for the lease as well as the proceeds from the port. Subsequently, Djibouti has not progressed in the way that many expected. Other major problems include very high unemployment (estimated at eighty percent) and widespread khat-chewing, which debilitates the population. In regard to the Djiboutian military, it has not been developed into a professional force and is not as capable as others in the sub-region. The United States had been trying to persuade the military to deploy to Somalia as part of AMISOM. However, there has been reluctance to do so due to a lack of capability and unwillingness to fight and kill fellow Somalis.
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US Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya 81
The embassy is the largest in sub-Saharan Africa. It is where Eastern African sub-regional policy and Somalia policy have been made (in coordination with DoS in Washington, DC) and implemented.
Also, USAID has a regional office in Nairobi that deals with sustainable development in the Eastern Africa. In contrast to the US Embassy in Djibouti, the embassy in Nairobi works well in some areas with AFRICOM and CJTF-HOA and does not in other areas.
From the perspective of several interviewees in the US Embassy in mid-2012, Kenya and AMISOM were continuing to make strides in Somalia against Al Shabaab. 82 The United States had played a role in encouraging the Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) to enter Somalia and advance on Kismayo. Initially, the KDF was reluctant to intervene. However, Kenya decided to act after tourists were kidnapped in coastal Kenya near the Somalia border in mid-2011. However, some international legal experts viewed Kenya's action as an invasion, which caused problems until June 2012 in inducting Kenya into AMISOM. 83 An official in charge of security sector reform in Somalia over the years asserted that DoD and the US military were not as forward-leaning and active as they should have been in supporting AMISOM and Somali forces and stabilization efforts in Somalia; this was partly due to the 1993 Black Hawk down experience. 84 Given that the embassy was the center of US efforts to prepare South Sudan government officials and security forces for independence, an interviewee believed that the same should be true in Somalia.
Therefore, it was deemed important to keep security cooperation efforts for AMISOM countries and Somalia under control of the ambassador and embassy (and not to place it in the hands of AFRICOM).
Embassy officials asserted that they would the most effective force in securing training for Republic of Somalia forces and helping to develop a ministry of defense. 85 The perspectives of officials interviewed at the embassy (and USAID) were mostly skeptical of CJTF-HOA's civil affairs activities. A USAID official who had been in Nairobi for more than five years saw the CA teams making the same mistakes as they had in the previous five years. 86 The regional USAID director was mixed in his evaluation of the work of CJTF-HOA CA teams throughout the subregion. 87 A DoD official in the embassy asserted that the DoS was holding back on support for AMISOM.
State Department lawyers were arguing that the arms embargo on Somalia placed a block on weapons transfers to the TFG, Ethiopia and Kenya. In this respect, DoS was hindering US efforts to improve the security situation in Somalia. Also, DoS has barred AFRICOM and CJTF-HOA from operating in Somalia.
96
The perspectives of USAID officials in Addis Ababa were that CJTF-HOA CA teams support projects that USAID contracts out to NGOs. The US Ambassador has not allowed CA teams to operate on their own, given the problems that were encountered in previous years. 97 One CJTF-HOA CA officer asserted that CA teams working in the vicinity of Dire Dawa and Awasa were paying dividends in two strategic locations; 98 the former is close to the Ogaden and the latter is on the road to Kenya. 99 The CJTF-HOA Liaison Officer commented that there was a problem in Ethiopia of spending Title 10, Section 1206
and Section 1207 funds in a Title 22 zone (see Appendix C). 100 There were restrictions on how the money could be used that prevented CA teams from operating more effectively in Ethiopia. 101 The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) was ordered by the chief of staff (General Samora Yenus) not to drill wells and conduct other civil affairs activities. However, US CJTF-HOA CA teams continued drilling and conducting CA activities on their own in parts of Ethiopia, which demonstrated a rift between the two partners. The hypothesis that the US military is likely to seek out roles and missions -no matter how detached from strategy -producing "mission creep" has been upheld in this case. This reference to mission creep does not pertain to escalating force but, instead, expanding the mission into areas where there is little strategic knowledge and perspective in order to keep the force actively engaged and to continue to justify its existence. CJTF-HOA charged into attempting to win hearts and minds through CA teams. Afterwards, CJTF-HOA switched to generating good will and assisting with the development of the CA teams of African militaries.
The Obama administration has put forward a strategy for Africa, including security against violent extremism and sustainable development. 103 However, the different perspectives and actions of the US embassies, CJTF-HOA and AFRICOM are indicative of the "stovepipe" orientations of US agencies and the difficulties of forging interagency cooperation to achieve that strategy. The larger strategic aims that the United States has established for Africa have been hampered by AFRICOM's determination to implement its own campaign plan and the autonomy of the embassies from DoS control. US national security policy will continue to be hampered by this structural problem. The HASC voiced concern, however, that Section 1208 should not to become a "train and equip" program managed by Special Operations Command (SOCOM). The HASC also expressed uneasiness over the use of private contractors to carry out Section 1208 activities and thus required additional reporting requirements to track such contracting. The SASC bill did not raise the Section 1208 funding level, and the committee expressed dissatisfaction with current reporting. SASC voiced concern that SOCOM may be using 1208 funds to leverage long-term engagement with partner nations rather than exclusively for supporting military operations by US special operations forces to combat terrorism. The SASC asked SOCOM to review their Section 1208 execution to eliminate such leveraging. HASC did increase, however, the CCIF purchase authority from $10 million to $20 million. The US Code currently limits the purchase of items with a unit cost in excess of $15,000 to not more than $10 million.
Combatant Commander
The HASC required "coordination" with the Secretary of State when the funds are to be used for humanitarian or civic assistance purposes; the SASC offered no such addition. The SASC bill increased the unit cost threshold for CCIF items, from $15,000 to $250,000; the HASC bill also increased the unit cost threshold but did not specify an amount. The HASC and the SASC viewed both the stability and special operations requests as activities to be conducted within Section 1206. Both houses expressed that they would consider using Section 1206 to build the capacity of NATO and other coalition partners in stability and special operations in which the United States is a direct participant. To limit the potential impact of such multi-year programs the SASC placed a $75 million ceiling on Section 1206 funding that can be used to support stability and special operations.
Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) is distinct from CCIF and enables a commander
(such as the commander of CJTF-HOA) to disburse funds for humanitarian needs, which may have the purpose of winning hearts and minds. However, the funds cannot be used to benefit US or coalition military forces. 
